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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NICHOLE P. REDDISH, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
SAMUEL RUSSELL, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Appellate Court No, 
20040027CA 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Petitioner Nichole P. Reddish submits the following reply to 
Respondent's brief: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
Appellees Point 1 is that Petitioner has failed to marshal 
the evidence. In particular, that Appellant has failed to 
present "in a comprehensive and fastidious order' any fatal flaws 
in the evidence which show that the decision of the trial court 
is 'clearly erroneous". Appellee then recites 9 paragraphs that 
purport to illustrate that there were no fatal flaws in the 
evidence. 
Before addressing the nine arguments of Appellee, it must be 
1 
noted that Appellee failed to dispute Appellant's Statement of 
Facts. Thus, they stand as alleged. 
Second, Appellee failed to rebut, with anything but 
generalizations, Appellant's evidence of Mr. Russell's other 
children's needs, the quantified evidence of need of Marquel, 
including chapter and verse marshaling of the Court's findings 
juxtaposed with contrary evidence, or even the essence of the 
trial and the brief, i.e., the particular needs of Marquel. 
Appellees only response was a regurgitation of the lower court's 
findings. 
Appellant addresses the fatal flaws as follows. 
Appellee recites the following findings the lower Court 
made: 
1. "When the parties' combined income exceeds $10,000, the 
child support is based upon the reasonable needs of the child". 
(Findings of Fact No. 9, R-640). 
This is indeed the law. However, the flaw here is that 
neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Utah Supreme Court 
defines "the reasonable needs of the children". Further, there 
are no statutes that provide a definition. Ms. Reddish indicated 
in her brief how other jurisdictions resolved the virtually 
identical issue of the reasonable needs of the child having some 
bearing in the relative wealth of the parents, and that the trend 
in defining "reasonable needs" in surrounding states and 
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elsewhere reflected the trend that children are entitled to be 
supported in a style and condition consonant with the wealth of 
their parents. This is especially noteworthy since the Appellee 
cited Reinhart and Ball as Determinative Authorities, but neither 
case defined what constituted the reasonable needs of the child 
under the "appropriate and just" standard. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals in Reinhart "...articulated the required fact findings 
for a just and appropriate award...in Ball v. Peterson" so it is 
clear that the lower Court must enter fact findings for a just 
and appropriate award, but the Court is left to its own means to 
determine "just and appropriate". x Where clear and definitive 
"badges" that might constitute reasonable needs are not set forth 
by statute but nevertheless mandated by the Court, a look to the 
national trend set by other jurisdictions is in order and should 
be adopted by this Court. 
McGinley v. Herman, 50 Cal.App.4f 936, (Cal. App. 1996), 
<http://www.versuslaw.com>, at 29, cited In re Marriage of 
Catalano (1988) 204 Cal App. 3d 543. In Catalano, the mother 
1
 The dicta in the "not for official publication" case of Black v. Barney. 2000 Ut App 369, 
the Court speaks of quantitative evidence such as a 'discussion of the children's specific expenses, 
and cited, in footnote 1, that a trial exhibit that provided for an accurate accounting of the 
children's pro rata share of the housing and utility costs were quantitative evidence. For 
Appellant's Ms. Reddish's quantitative evidence, other than previously cited in pages 24 through 
31; see also Trial Transcript 35,13-25; 36, 1-14; for Mr. Russell's children's expenses; Trial 
Exhibit 14 (addendum exhibit 3), for a breakdown of Marquel's activities; Trial Exhibit 17, 
Petitioner Ms. Reddish's Financial Declaration; Trial Exhibit 22, Summary of Expenses for 
Activities; and Trial Exhibit 23, Canceled checks). 
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sought an increase in child support from $475 per month to 
$2,000. The father was wealthy, and, as in the case at bar, the 
father owned two residences and had numerous automobiles. The 
court found that "a child's need for more than the bare 
necessities...varies with the parents' circumstances... 
Accordingly, where the supporting parent enjoys a lifestyle that 
far exceeds that of the custodial parent, child support must to 
some degree reflect the more opulent lifestyle even, though this 
may, as a practical matter, produce a benefit for the custodial 
parent." (Id, at p.552) "The Catalano court found that, under the 
circumstances presented, ^the only tolerable award would be the 
full $2,000 that [the mother] requested. Anything less would 
ignore the tremendous disparity between [the child's] lifestyle 
and that of his father" (Id, at p. 556). The Utah Court of 
Appeals, in a case that predated Reinhart, stated "Child support 
awards should approximate actual need and, when possible, assure 
the children a standard of living comparable to that which they 
would have experienced if no divorce had occurred". Ostler v. 
Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The Appellant has provided quantitative evidence of the 
reasonable needs of Marquel, both in the initial brief and in the 
context of Black v. Barney. 
2. "Respondent's income is irrelevant". (Findings of Fact 
No. 11; R-641). 
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This "fatal flaw" is so fatal as to keep even Lazarus down. 
"In cases such as this, where the parties' monthly combined 
adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in the 
statutory table, the court must decide whether there has been a 
substantial change of circumstances warranting a modification of 
a child support award based solely on an increase in the 
obligor's income, which there enables him to provide greater 
support. See Harrison v. Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180, 182," as 
cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 
<http://www,versuslaw.com>, at para. 71. Ball continues, in the 
same paragraph, "The district court found that Mr. Peterson's 
monthly income had increased from $10,500 to $14,583, an 
increase of approximately 40%. Therefore, we do not find that 
the court exceeded the permitted range of its discretion in 
concluding that a substantial change of circumstances occurred". 
Not only did the lower court find that the Respondent's income is 
irrelevant, but stated "I don't have a clue what was going on 
back in 1999 when the present order was agreed to between the 
parties. So really I'm required to deny the petition on that 
basis alone" (T.T. 147, 23-24, 148, 1-3, Findings of Fact para. 
21). This is another fatal flaw by the Court, since Trial 
Exhibit 1 was Mr. Russell's 1999 income tax return, and clearly 
showed his income for 1999, and Trial Exhibit 4, which was Mr. 
Russell's 2000 income tax return, which showed his income for 
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2000. The 1999 income tax return reflected substantial income 
well in excess of the 1997 annual income of $126,589 (introduced 
as Trial Exhibit 2). Mr. Russell's income for 1999 was $375,191. 
(Trial Exhibit 1, Appellant's Brief Addendum No. 6). This was 
also net income, just as Mr. Russell's income tax return of 2000 
was net income, which net income was $440,823. The difference 
between net income of the 1997 income (utilized for the 1999 
order) is the difference in percentage between $126,589 and 
$440,823 which is approximately 300 percent. Obviously, there is 
a much greater difference than the 40% the Court of Appeals found 
sufficient to warrant a material and substantial change of 
circumstances in the Ball case. 
3. "Respondent's income has not increased from $10,549.00 
(granted by Order in 1999) to $448,023.00 annually (present) 
because you just can't take Respondent s^ tax return and divide 
the return by the number of months in a year. Respondent is 
responsible to pay taxes and there are also business expenses to 
calculate, which are indicated in his return on the schedules. 
Respondent's income has increased, but that increase standing by 
itself has nothing to do to (sic) with whether or not there is a 
difference in the child's needs from 1999 to the present''. 
(Findings of Fact No. 16; R-641). 
Unfortunately, the lower court was, well, dead wrong. The 
"fatal flaw" here is that even a cursory review of the 2000 
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income tax return (Trial Exhibit 4) shows his NET income, on line 
22, to be $440,823. The first page shows wages, etc., at 
$60,497, taxable interest at $6,123, and $694 from Ordinary 
dividends. Subtracting capital gain or loss at -$3,000 (see 
Schedule D for breakdown, that indicates the actual loss was 
$5,068 but the maximum allowed by the tax code is $3,000, hence -
$3,000 on line 13) the next figure is $375,522 on Line 17. Line 
17 is made up of rental income, in this case rent from a 
commercial building which on Schedule E shows that to be $76,076, 
combined with Sub S and total partnership income on Schedule E, 
Part II, line 31, is $299,446. This $299,446 is the net profit 
after all of the expenses have been taken out. Therefore, the 
$299,446 plus the commercial rental income of $76,076 equals 
$375,522, the figure on line 17 of Mr. Russell's first page of 
his 2000 income tax return. 
Frankly, it is elemental that the Individual Tax Return 
(1040) is what is left after all expenses have been taken out. 
That should not have been an issue at all with the lower court.2 
4. "The minor child in question is an eleven year old girl. 
The Court has trouble believing that it is physically possible 
for the minor child to participate in all the activities 
2
 It is well known that the primary reason people have Sub S corporations is to save on 
payment of Social Security taxes and the medicare wage base. That would explain why Mr. 
Russell only indicated a wage, which he himself determines, of $36,497 on his 1999 income tax 
return, and $60,497 on his 2000 return. 
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presented to the Court". (Findings of Fact No. 17; R-642). 
This is in contradiction to Trial Exhibit 14, which listed 
Marquel's activities, and the testimony of Marquel's mother and 
Jeff Wolfe, and Mr. Wolfe's canceled checks illustrating payments 
made for those activities, in Trial Exhibit 21. 
5. "The Court has difficulties with Petitioner's 
credibility as to the expenses of the activities for the minor 
child. The Exhibits are not accurate. There are no reasonable 
explanations for how these expenses are being covered". 
(Findings of Fact No. 18; R-642). 
The judge at trial stated "I'm glad Mr. Wolfe is out there 
apparently willing to cough up the funds to pay for those, if in 
fact that's what's happening". (T.T. 145, 19-21). Also, "I don't 
know that she's paying more than she should for any of these 
things. I just know what Mr. Wolfe is paying on behalf of the 
child", (T.T. 138, 12-14). Other than the court's perception, 
there was no evidence submitted by Respondent to counter the 
testimony of Ms. Reddish or Mr. Wolfe. There was no evidence to 
counter the canceled checks of Mr. Wolfe, found at Trial Exhibits 
21, nor any evidence presented to counter Exhibits 14, 17,20 or 
22. 
6. "'$450 per month for extracurricular activities is not 
reasonable". (Findings of Fact No. 19; R-642). 
Findings of Fact, para. 23 states, "The Court determined 
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that a better standard in regard to the reasonable needs of the 
child should be something similar to what the Respondent is 
paying for his other children. The Respondent listed about 
$500.00 per month per child in his answers to his interrogatories 
which doesn't include housing or utilities'7. 
Curiously, the trial judge ignored the private schooling 
that Mr. Russell had enrolled his children in for two years prior 
to the filing of the modification petition, the testimony by Mr. 
Russell that he and his wife "cut-back" the lavish Christmas's 
they had previously been giving their children (at about the same 
time the modification was filed), that child Taylor needs $200 
per month for gymnastics, and didn't challenge the extremely low 
average monthly costs of movies and entertainment at $5 per 
month. (T.T. 35, 13-25; 36, 1-15; 36, 1-14, Trial Exhibit 6, pgs. 
3 and 4). 
Even following the trial judge's prescription for a better 
way of deducing reasonable needs for a child, it is clear that 
Marquel fell well within that definition. $450 per month was not 
unreasonable and is another fatal flaw in the lower court's 
calculation. 
7. "Child support is not designed to insure that the minor 
child lives in the same kind of house that Respondent's other 
children live in. This is not an alimony case". (Findings of 
Fact No. 20; R-642). 
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"Child support awards should approximate actual need and, 
when possible, assure the children a standard of living 
comparable to that which they would have experienced if no 
divorce had occurred". Ostler v. Ostler, 789 p.2d 713, 716 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). Although the parties never married, the logic is 
the same. 
8. MNo evidence was presented to show that the reasonable 
needs of the child had changed since the 1999 modification". 
(Findings of Fact No. 21; R-642). 
This is begging the question. The reasonable needs of the 
child was not the criterion utilized by the Office of Recovery 
Services in 1999. They used the expediency of accepting 
Respondent's income for 1997 for the 1999 order, since even his 
1997 exceeded the maximum amount on the child support tables. 
They did not look to the reasonable needs of Marquel and 
therefore this issue was not addressed in the 1999 order. They 
further compounded the inequity by deducting his children in 
current home from that income, which had the effect of reducing 
his child support. This would not have occurred had his real 
income be used. 
The evidence presented clearly illustrated that whatever 
the reasonable needs were in 1999, they were not being met on 
September 25, 2001, when the Petition to Modify was filed. 
Further, there was an obvious material and substantial change of 
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circumstances as indicated in Mr. Russell's gigantic increase of 
income from the 1999 order (again, based on 1997 income) to his 
income in 2001. Finally, the implication of both Ball and 
Reinhart are that "The increase in ability to pay must be 
considered in light of the children's actual needs in fashioning 
an "appropriate and just" child support award under section 78-
45-7(12)". Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757 (Utah App. 1998), 
<http://www/versuslaw.com>, paragraph 23. 
9. "The reasonable needs of the child are being met". 
(Findings of Fact No. 22; R-642). 
They are not. Marquel needs to have subsidized school 
lunches and would not have been able to participate in the extra-
curricular activities alluded to at trial were it not for the 
friend of the family, Jeff Wolfe. (See above, particularly 
paragraphs 4 , 5 and 6). 
Additionally, in opposing counsel's closing, the court 
queried about what the reasonable needs of the child were, as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Well, what are the reasonable, what is 
reasonable? Is soccer, softball, piano, skiing, whatever else is 
listed there? Why isn't that reasonable? 
MR. DOPP: I think some of those things. 
THE COURT: For this child. 
MR. DOPP: I think some of those things are reasonable. I 
think soccer, piano, dance, Junior Jazz, softball, skiing, there 
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are a lot of different levels of these activities. There are a 
lot of different teachers that you could maintain. My wife took 
violin lessons. You could go to a person from the Utah Symphony 
and pay a lot of money for violin lessons or you could go to 
someone local. 
THE COURT: I don't know that she's paying more than she 
should for any of these things. I just know that Mr. Wolf is 
paying on behalf of the child. 
MR DOPP: It seems to me that going to Hawaii for soccer is 
a little bit more than your local AYSO type of soccer. 
THE COURT: I guess it depends on whether or not your child 
is going to be world-class soccer player. 
MR. DOPP: That's correct. My argument is that reasonable 
needs of the children, needs we're talking about, would obviously 
the shelter, clothing, food.. 
THE COURT: No. It means more than that. 
This concludes the Appellees reference to the court's 
Findings of Fact. The Appellee next argues that the $448,823 
amount is not the actual income of the Respondent, and cites the 
Court's reasoning that dividing that amount by twelve months is 
inaccurate because "... you've got to pay a few taxes on Four 
Hundred and Forty-Thousand Dollars last time I checked with the 
I.R.S. and that was last month." . (T.T. 144-145). The court 
went on to explain there were business expenses on a sub chapter 
S, and that they were all right there in the schedules. 
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Unfortunately, as explained in response to Finding No. 3 above, 
this is "fatally" inaccurate. 
POINT II 
a. The Respondent argues that the trial court did not err 
in determining that there was not a material and substantial 
change of circumstances and that the Respondent's income was 
correctly determined. 
As can be seen in Finding No. 3 above, the Respondent's 
income was incorrectly determined. However, Respondent then 
submits that, even if there were errors, they were harmless and 
thus non-prejudicial to Petitioner. 
The error was critical to the trial court's perception of 
the very issue that would or would not allow a finding of a 
material and substantial change of circumstances. If there were 
no material and substantial change of circumstances, as the court 
found, the pleading party is out of court. That is exactly what 
occurred when the trial court made the determination that 
Respondent's income was irrelevant, as discussed in Finding 2. 
b. Respondent's next argument is that the Petitioner 
failed to introduce evidence to establish the reasonable needs of 
the child. This has previously been responded to in the 
preceding paragraphs. 
c. Respondent maintains, without supporting documentation, 
that "The facts of each of the cases cited in Appellant's Brief 
to support this argument [that there is a trend in other 
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jurisdictions that favor sharing the wealth of the parents with 
the minor children] that is inaccurate because "each of the cases 
...differ substantially from this case". Respondent seeks to 
distinguish the cases, apparently, because the Petitioner and the 
Respondent were never married. However, that is not the defining 
characteristics of these cases. What is uniform and consistent 
is that it is the parents high income that drives the argument, 
not the marital status. Petitioner's response to Finding No. 1 
above is incorporated herein for reference, and a review of the 
McGinlev v. Herman and the In re Marriage of Catalano, for its 
legal reasoning, is encouraged. Also, In re the Marriage of 
Cheriton, 92 Cal. App. 4th 269, a California Appeals Court 
holding in 2001, found that "Child support may therefore 
appropriately improve the stcindard of living of the custodial 
household to improve the lives of the children" (para.30). They 
allude to their guidelines, but that special circumstances exist 
that "include a parent's extraordinarily high income"(para. 31), 
and cites, in para. 34, that a trial court was reversed for an 
abuse of discretion when it failed to "give sufficient 
consideration to the child's right to share in the standard of 
living of his extraordinarily high earning father". Indeed, 
later on it cites the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversal of 
a case, finding that "it did not permit the child 'to share in 
her father's good fortune of having inherited a tremendous amount 
of money and real property assets". (Para. 51, cited in County 
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of Kern v. C a s t l e , 75 Cal . App. 4th 1442). 
Finally, Respondent argues that a careful reading of the 
White case cited by Petitioner (White v. Marciano, 190 Cal. App. 
1026, 1987) reveals that the California court actually took a 
similar approach to Utah Courts, in that the child's needs must 
be reasonable. What the Respondent ignores, though, is that 
these "needs" are more than just the basic necessities. The 
White case held, "Clearly, where the child has a wealthy parent, 
that child is entitled to, and therefore 'needs' something more 
than the bare necessities of life". (Id, at 1032). 
POINT III 
Respondent argues that Appellant is not the prevailing party 
and therefore attorney's fees should not be awarded to Appellant. 
This is problematic unless this court reverses the lower 
court's decision. 
POINT IV 
Respondent argues that because the parties agreed to share 
medical and dental expenses that their agreement should not be 
altered. 
Respondent fails to acknowledge, first, the change of 
circumstances from when this agreement was made. When this 
agreement was entered into, Mr. Russell had an income of $20,000 
and Ms. Reddish was unemployed, attending school and receiving 
State aid. (R. 167-173; Findings of Fact, para. 5 , 7 and 13). 
The order in 1999 was a mirror of the 1994 order with respect to 
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medical cost sharing; the only change was a child support 
increase.3 The parties also agreed that both parties would 
secure insurance if it became available to them (1994 Order, 
para. 2; R. 174-179). 
Second, although Respondent wants to insist on a strict 
enforcement of an agreement made in 1994 and continued in 1999, 
as to each party maintaining one-half of the medical costs, there 
is no insistence on the corollary, i.e., that each would secure 
insurance if it became available to them. Mr. Russell, as his 
own employer (T.T. 174-179), certainly had it within his control. 
He never secured dental insurance on his daughter Marquel until 
AFTER she had the need for braces. He certainly, with his 
$30,000 plus income per month, could easily handle one-half of 
that additional expense. Ms. Reddish could not easily handle it, 
and the lower court made a fatal flaw when it did not consider 
the enormous disparity between the income of the parties as to 
this issue. Ms. Reddish makes about 4% of Mr. Russell's income, 
and, in fact, he paid more in charity contributions reported in 
his 2000 income tax return than Ms. Reddish made ($19, 515 income 
for Ms. Reddish, $31, 897 charitable contribution by Mr. Russell. 
See Trial Exhibit 4, Schedule A, Itemized deductions, p. 34, 
3
 Although this agreement was by stipulation, it was not originated by Respondent Mr. 
Russell. He paid nominal child support from 1994 through 1999 of $224, even when, in 1999, his 
income was $375,191 (Trial Exhibit 1). He did not voluntarily increase his income, it came only 
as the result of the Office of Recovery Services filing an action against him for higher child 
support. 
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Appellant's Brief). Petitioner introduced evidence as to this 
disparity in income and the increased medical costs of Marquel, 
in particular orthodontia costs, and the court ought to have 
found a material and substantial change of circumstances on this 
basis alone. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in the Appellant's Brief and 
Appellant's Reply Brief, the court should grant judgment in favor 
of the Appellant. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2004. 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
Attorney for Appellant 
and Petitioner Nichole 
P. Reddish 
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